“Climate change is an increasingly destabilizing force—an accelerating destabilization force—and it’s impacting our operational environment, it’s creating new missions, and our allies and partners are going to be called to respond to these increased demands,” said Brigadier General Rebecca Sonkiss, Deputy Director for Counter Threats and International Cooperation at the Joint Staff J5, at a recent event hosted by the Wilson Center and the Center for Climate and Security. At the event, senior U.S. Government officials reflected on the significance of the Biden administration’s new climate security reports and how climate security is being prioritized and coordinated across defense and development, providing insight into the administration’s whole-of-government approach.

As the COVID-19 pandemic reached all corners of the world, countries rapidly introduced a series of containment policies to stop its spread, including school and workplace closures, restrictions on gathering size, and limits to population movement. In contrast to complete or partial border closures for foreign nationals, restrictions on population movements within one’s country have received much less attention, despite the fact that most countries introduced restrictions on internal migration during the pandemic in the form of bans on inter- or intra-provincial travel, or partial or complete lockdowns. With over 300 million internal migrants in India and 261 million in China (out of an estimated 760 million internal migrants worldwide), these barriers to mobility are particularly acute in Asia. But are they effective?

Secretary of State Blinken is right to focus on climate change and democracy during his first trip to sub-Saharan Africa. At the top of his and everyone else’s mind should be the question: will democratic backsliding in countries like Benin make it more difficult to deal with the effects of climate change? Even more worrisome: will it worsen conflict hotspots, such as the West African Sahel, where climate change is playing a role? All eyes should be on coastal West Africa as countries such as Benin deal with violent insecurity and climate pressure creeping down from the Sahel. My ongoing research in Benin suggests that the country’s democratic local institutions, despite all their faults, are the country’s best defense against the breakdown in rural governance that has befallen Mali and neighboring Burkina Faso. 

International attention often focuses on ethnic conflict in the Niger Delta and religious conflict in Northern Nigeria, leaving farmer-herdsmen overlooked. In Nigeria, the conflict between farmers and herders has posed severe security challenges and has claimed far more lives than the Boko Haram insurgency. The conflict has threatened the country’s security, undermined national stability and unity, killed and displaced hundreds of thousands of people, and increased ethnic, regional, and religious polarization.

This past March, the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) offered five scenarios for global development in 2040. Two months later, the OECD released three scenarios for the future of global cooperation in 2035. Curious development professionals and others who like to peer into the future are no doubt asking: How does each organization see the future? Are the scenarios similar, different, closely aligned or wildly divergent? 

“Since time immemorial, rape has been used to control women’s sexuality, labor, and reproduction, to shred the social fabric, to conquer territories and populations, and crush the enemy’s moral and will to resist,” said Under Secretary General Pramila Patten, UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, at an event focused on addressing conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) organized by The Secretary’s Office for Global Women’s Issues, Search for Common Ground, and the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security. In the past two decades, legislative reform, sanctions against perpetrators, and systematic reporting have slowly transformed the climate of impunity surrounding CRSV, said Patten.

Last week, in an unprecedented show of coordination to address the connections between climate change and security, the Biden-Harris Administration released four reports—which taken together, mark significant progress in the effort to center climate change in U.S. national security and foreign policy. The documents—which fulfill key requirements laid out in two Executive Orders issued by President Biden in the early days of his administration—describe how climate change will increasingly heighten instability and influence the United States’ strategic interests, including shaping competition with other great powers—most significantly, China.

“We are really taking a whole-of-government approach to address the challenges posed by climate change,” said Jennifer DeCesaro, Director for Climate Security and Resilience at the U.S. National Security Council, at a recent Wilson Center event hosted as part of the 2021 Berlin Climate and Security Conference. President Biden has taken an unequivocal position on climate change: The administration’s first order of business was to issue a series of executive orders aimed at catalyzing climate action. Putting the full institutional weight of the U.S. government behind this agenda requires a re-orientation of domestic and international security, development, and diplomacy. Creating “new muscle memory” on how we approach these typically siloed challenges is essential to elevating climate policy, said DeCesaro.