Yet another world leader is predicting impending water wars. Today at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said, “Our experiences tell us that environmental stress due to lack of water may lead to conflict, and it will be greater in poor nations.” Agreed. Water stress may lead to conflict, but a historical analysis shows that it is actually more likely lead to a cooperative outcome than a conflictive one. (For a quick summary of water conflict and cooperation and how water can be a force for peace rather than war, see ECSP Director Geoff Dabelko’s co-authored piece on the subject, “Water Can Be a Pathway to Peace, Not War.”)

Last week, I attended a conference hosted by the Berkeley China Initiative and the Luce Foundation entitled “China’s Environment: What Do We Know and How Do We Know it?” The two-day conference attracted many of the big names on China’s environment: leading Chinese journalist and environmentalist Ma Jun, Barbara Finamore of the Natural Resources Defense Council, Orville Schell of the University of California, Berkeley, and Jim Yardley of The New York Times, to name a few. While many of the speakers addressed the two questions in the title of the conference, a presentation that stuck in my mind was by the University of Alberta’s Wenrang Jiang, who also asked, “What should we know about China’s environment?” Proposed answers to this question surfaced and resurfaced throughout the conference, but there are a few with which most attendees would likely concur.

First, and most importantly, as Westerners addressing China’s environmental crises, we need to understand that China’s government and people do not need to be told how bad their environment is: They know. What they need are the technology and technical assistance to address these problems. A particularly striking example of where technical tools are needed, raised by speaker Ye Qi of Tsinghua University and again this week at a China Environment Forum meeting in Washington, D.C., is data collection. China needs researchers, academics, and policymakers to guide the development of a strong data collection infrastructure.

Second, we must recognize that China is not a threatening environmental culprit. In fact, many Chinese environmental regulations and policies are more progressive than our own. China’s biggest challenge is developing the mechanisms to enforce these policies and regulations at the local level—another area in which assistance from abroad could be particularly fruitful. Although several laboratories recently declared that China surpassed the United States in total carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions this year, China’s per capita CO2 emissions are still only one-sixth of the United States’ per capita emissions. China and India’s combined CO2 emissions account for only 10 percent of the world’s total; furthermore, according to speaker Gang He of Columbia University, 27 percent of China’s emissions are due to goods it manufactures and then exports. China’s vehicle emissions laws will meet Euro IV standards nationwide by 2010, which 90 percent of U.S.-manufactured sport utility vehicles could not pass today.

Finally, we must bear in mind the level of pollution-related suffering that occurs in China. We cannot simply impose lofty, globally beneficial programs upon a population struggling daily with unmet human needs. A presentation by Shannon May of the University of California, Berkeley, on the failure of an eco-village in China illustrated this point beautifully. May polled villagers to find out why they had not moved into a new eco-village that had been built to improve land and energy efficiency. She discovered something environmentalists had failed to note: With the 60,000 RMB required to move into the eco-village homes, villagers could instead invest in aquaculture or other industries with high returns, build a home to their own specifications, or pay for a wedding for their children. We must make sure that global goals—such as slowing climate change—that require sacrifices from certain populations also produce tangible local benefits, such as reducing toxic air pollutants.

As several attendees mentioned during the conference, China needs more yin from its Western partners—more patience, flexibility, and self reflection, particularly. Many international NGOs that have worked in China for a long time understand this, but larger bilateral programs shaped by political agendas are not always as flexible.

By CEF Program Assistant Linden Ellis.

The country of Arborlind is in bad shape. It falls in the bottom quarter of countries on the Human Development Index, and much of the majority-rural population lives on $1 a day. In addition, Arborlind is experiencing rapid population growth, and 40 percent of the population is under the age of 15. Deforestation and environmental degradation continue unabated in Arborlind, as families depend on natural resources for their livelihoods, and agriculture is often carried out unsustainably.

Nevertheless, there is hope that Arborlind’s natural beauty, impressive landscapes, and unique flora and fauna will translate into an adventure tourism market that will help turn around the country’s economy. This is particularly true in Floriana National Park, home not only to unique plants and animals, but also to the indigenous Sedentaire and—for part of the year—Wandran tribes.

The future of Floriana is a topic of much debate in Arborlind. The Conservonly Foundation of California wants to preserve it, but demands that all people be removed and prevented from re-entering. Civil society prioritizes poverty alleviation and livelihood generation, and is also fighting for improving human health and the environment. The private sector wants a positive regulatory environment that allows the tourism and agribusiness industries access to land and water resources. Finally, the government of Arborlind wants to improve the economy and protect the tribes, but more than anything else wants to prevent the conflict between these groups from turning into an embarrassing scene just two months before it hosts soccer’s African Cup.

This was the situation that health and environment practitioners, policymakers, scholars, and journalists were presented with at a conference last month in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The participants in the Arborlind simulation—written by ECSP’s Geoff Dabelko and Gib Clarke, along with Shewaye Deribe Woldeyohannes of the Ethio Wetlands and Natural Resources Association—switched roles for an afternoon, as they sought solutions to the problems in Arborlind. Wearing different hats—a health minister playing the part of a hotelier, for example—participants reported gaining new perspectives and increased understanding of sustainable development challenges and potential solutions.

The simulation exercise was part of the “Population, Health, and Environment: Integrated Development for East Africa” conference, attended by more than 200 people from Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, and 17 other countries. Participants presented real-world solutions to problems very similar to those in Arborlind, explaining how all parties can—and must—come together to address people’s multifaceted needs.

I have attended more conferences than I care to remember. But this conference was unique: There was tremendous excitement about the potential of integrated programs to address population, health, environment, and other challenges in East Africa. There was also a palpable sense of community, as different organizations from different countries realized that there were others like them, also seeking to solve complicated problems with integrated solutions. Hopefully, the lessons learned and the networks formed will sustain the energy that came out of the conference, and lead to an increase in the number and sophistication of integrated programs in East Africa.

The Gran Chaco of Bolivia, Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil is one of South America’s most extensive biogeographical regions. It is characterized by diverse ecosystems and is inhabited by, among others, the 10,000 indigenous Guaraní people known as the Isoceños. However, Bolivia’s Chaco, the most unspoiled portion, is being degraded by ranching, farming, commercial hunting, highway construction, and the development of Bolivia’s natural gas industry, threatening the livelihoods of the Isoceños.

In 1991, the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) and the Capitanía de Alto y Bajo Izozog (CABI), an indigenous organization representing the Isoceños, began working together to protect the Bolivian Chaco. The cooperation was highly successful, resulting in the creation of the Kaa-Iya del Gran Chaco National Park and Integrated Management Area in 1995, which designates millions of hectares as a protected national park and another million as “indigenous territory.” For WCS, this successful collaboration is evidence that environmental groups and indigenous peoples can—and should—work together to maximize their influence.

More recently, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), environmental and Pygmy organizations united to press the World Bank to cease industrial logging in the DRC; grant the Pygmies greater input into forest issues; carry out a comprehensive assessment of logging’s environmental impacts; and encourage the development of environmentally friendly industries.

Conservationists and indigenous peoples have more leverage when they speak with one voice. However, there is often distrust between the two sides. Conservationists may accuse indigenous peoples of contributing to the degradation of a fragile ecosystem. Conversely, indigenous peoples can fear their livelihoods will be threatened by the creation of protected areas. In India, for instance, members of aboriginal tribes are now banned from gathering non-timber forest products such as honey, wild herbs, and fruits from parks and wildlife sanctuaries for commercial purposes. In the past, many of these tribes relied heavily on gathering and selling these products for their livelihoods.

In the future, the challenge will be finding sustainable solutions that satisfy both groups. This problem has no silver bullet. Instead, the commitment, imagination, and negotiating skills of the actors will make the difference.

Can environmental destruction justify military intervention? Robyn Eckersley, a professor of environmental politics at the University of Melbourne, Australia, explores the morality, legality, and legitimacy of such involvement in “Ecological Intervention: Prospects and Limits,” which appears in the latest issue of Ethics and International Affairs.

Eckersley argues that the United Nations—particularly the Security Council—possesses the authority to assume a larger role in protecting the environment. This idea is not original, however: Klaus Töpfer, former head of the UN Environment Programme, and Mikhail Gorbachev have both called for the creation of a “green helmets” force to respond to environmental crises.

Eckersley identifies three categories of environmental harm that could justify an ecological intervention—which she defines as “the threat or use of force by a state or coalition of states within the territory of another state and without the consent of that state in order to prevent grave environmental damage”—or the launch of an ecological defense—which she defines as “the preventive use of force in response to the threat of serious and immediate environmental harm flowing into the territory of a ‘victim’ state.”

1. A major environmental emergency with transboundary spillover effects. As an illustration, Eckersley hypothesizes a Chernobyl-like nuclear accident in a country that lacks the capacity to cope with the catastrophe but refuses foreign assistance. She argues that the notion of “territorial integrity” inscribed in the UN Charter can readily be interpreted to include “ecosystem integrity”—and therefore justify an intervention by an affected state. Currently, a country affected by another country’s nuclear accident can only hope for monetary reparations.
2. An ecocide—the result of intentional, systematic acts that cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the environment—involving serious human rights violations. Saddam Hussein’s decimation of the marsh region that was home to the Madan, or Marsh Arabs, is a case in point. Eckersley’s legal argument here relies on an expansive interpretation of the UN Charter’s notion of “threat to the peace.”
3. An ecocide involving no serious harm to human beings. An illustration of this situation would be the deployment of troops in the Great Lakes to protect the mountain gorillas. Contending that biodiversity is a “common concern of humankind,” Eckersley argues that states have a responsibility to other states to protect their environment, as the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development suggests.

Eckersley’s proposition, though interesting, suffers from a number of pitfalls. One major problem is that her argument could open the door to an extremely wide range of military interventions. For instance, her call for interventions to protect endangered species is extremely impractical—if not impossible—given the prediction that climate change will threaten the existences of millions of species will be at risk by 2050. One option—though not without serious problems of its own—would be to establish a list of “indispensable” species.

Another weakness of Eckersley’s article is that it neglects the role of incentives, focusing instead on the use of force, even though governments are often more receptive to the former. The army is probably not the organization best-suited to protecting coral or chimpanzees. Troop deployments are both financially and morally costly: Developing countries might view an increasing number of interventions by the Security Council as a violation of their sovereignty or a new form of colonization. Furthermore, it will take far more than military interventions to ensure the health of the environment.

Additional flaws in Eckersley’s argument include her attempt to build the case for ecological interventions on that of still-controversial humanitarian interventions, and her wish to saddle the United Nations with additional responsibilities.

Ecological intervention and ecological defense are interesting concepts, anticipating the future importance of the environment in foreign policy. However, Eckersley’s argument goes too far. Few countries would send troops into hostile territory solely to protect the local environment or wildlife. The necessary intermediate step is to continue studying the links between conflict and the environment, biodiversity, and climate change. That research will make possible the development of pragmatic, environment-centered conflict-prevention and conflict-resolution strategies.

“What we’re changing is how we do business, not what we do. And it is true, in Africa our focus has been basically around three issues…the first is civil control of the military and defense reform, which we see as sort of two sides of the same coin. The second is military professionalization, and the third is capacity building. And those three things are the things that DOD has been focused on in Africa for the probably about the last 10 years. And those three things will continue to be DOD’s focus in the context of capacity building and the mission of the command,” said Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Theresa Whelan, discussing the creation of AFRICOM, the U.S. military’s new Africa Command, with a group of foreign policy and security bloggers.

One issue Whelan expects AFRICOM to focus greater attention on is maritime security. She explained that several illicit maritime activities are hurting African economies and environments, including trafficking in people, weapons, and drugs; piracy, which has been on the rise recently; and illegal fishing—which can also damage coral reefs. “I think the World Bank did a study not too long ago—a couple of years ago—in which they found that…countries like Mozambique were losing in excess of a billion dollars a year in lost revenue from illegal fishing and also the destruction to their reefs—reef structures and also the depletion of their fishing resources,” said Whelan. A full transcript of the October 24, 2007, discussion is available online.

Egyptians took to the streets to protest water shortages this summer, reports Inter Press Service (IPS), but despite widespread domestic press coverage of the groundbreaking protests and repeated assurances from Egyptian government officials, Egypt seems to have made little progress in resolving its water shortage problems. Even after President Hosni Mubarak and his cabinet announced a plan to invest $180 million in the construction of small water purification centers in areas susceptible to shortages, popular protests began or continued in multiple provinces. Mohamed Nagi, head of the Habi Centre for Environmental Rights in Cairo, told IPS, “The recent demonstrations show that citizens have lost faith in longstanding government promises to provide them with adequate drinking water.”

Indeed, as the University of Maryland’s Ken Conca points out in “The New Face of Water Conflict,” “Amid the talk of looming ‘water wars,’ a less dramatic—but more immediate—link between water and violence is often ignored: the violence engendered by poor governance of water resources.” The IPS article seems to confirm Conca’s assertion that how well water is managed can be as important as how much water is available. According to Nagi, Egypt’s water infrastructure is chronically underfunded and mismanaged. The article also notes that a study by Egypt’s state-run National Research Centre found that 85 percent of Egypt’s total potable water was wasted due to the poor condition of water distribution systems.

Egypt faces persistent water shortages despite the fact that it and Sudan hold absolute rights to use 100 percent of the Nile’s water under agreements signed in 1929 and 1959. The other countries that depend on the Nile—Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—are poorer and less powerful than Egypt, so their access to water is even more precarious than Egypt’s. For one scholar’s vision of how the 10 countries of the Nile River basin could cooperate around shared water management, see Patricia Kameri-Mbote’s “Water, Conflict, and Cooperation: Lessons from the Nile River Basin.” Kameri-Mbote believes that the combined efforts of local and national civil society groups and the Nile Basin Initiative, a high-level forum that brings together ministers from the Nile basin countries, could lead to more stable, sustainable, and equitable use of the Nile’s water.

The recent discovery of a vast underground lake in Darfur has prompted hope for a resolution to the region’s terrible conflict, which is partially rooted in tensions over scarce resources—particularly water. Yet the lake is not a silver bullet. First of all, there may not be any water in it. Alain Gachet, a French geologist who has studied mineral and water exploration in Africa for 20 years, told BBC News that he thinks the lake is probably dry.

In addition, as The New York Times astutely observed, it is the way in which natural resources are managed—not simply their scarcity or abundance—that determines whether they further peace or conflict. Time and again, inexpert or corrupt management of plentiful natural resources has plunged nations into violence and poverty, rather than granted them prosperity. In Africa, this “resource curse” has been a regrettably common phenomenon.

A report released by the UN Environment Programme last month and an opinion piece by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon also highlighted how environmental factors have contributed to the crisis in Darfur.