Showing posts from category conflict.
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Environmental Impacts of Madagascar’s Coup
Cutting the Head Off Conservation
›June 24, 2010 // By Tara Innes
The coup in Madagascar in early 2009 not only politically destabilized the country, but also damaged its ability to protect its unique environment. A hotspot of biodiversity, Madagascar is the home of many species that exist nowhere else in the world.
Deposed president Marc Ravalomanana, while criticized for prioritizing business interests, was a proponent of environmental conservation who leveraged the natural wealth of his country to promote sustainable development.
The coup caused donors to withdraw aid to the country; destroyed the tourism industry, and changed the priorities of the country’s leadership. The new government, led by President Andry Rajoelina, has failed to help—and has possibly harmed–Madagascar’s rich ecosystem.
Shortly after the coup, the United States suspended all non-humanitarian aid to Madagascar, including aid targeted at conservation efforts. The World Bank and the African Union also cut aid to the country.
Without international aid—which provides 90 percent of the funding for conservation, according to MongaBay—parks and endangered species cannot be preserved and protected. Conservation International documented reports of endangered lemurs being slaughtered and sold for bushmeat by poachers.
Funding for USAID’s integrated population-health-environment programs, which seek to improve health and reduce population pressures in remote communities near protected areas, was also suspended. Prior to the coup such programs were heralded largely as a success.
Instability has also made Madagascar an unattractive vacation destination. The tourism industry – much of it eco-tourism – has taken a massive economic hit, losing 12 percent of its value in 2009 and depriving some communities of a major source of support. The drop in tourist visits to the country’s national parks has “a big impact on the economics of the villages as 50 percent of the park entrance fees are used for village conservation and development projects,” the manager of the Ranomafana National Park told MongaBay’s Rhett Butler earlier this year.
While Ravalomanana tripled the area of protected lands in Madagascar during his tenure as president, he also made several unpopular decisions leading to rising food costs and unrest. Just prior to the coup, South Korea’s Daewoo Logistics Corporation attempted to negotiate a 99-year lease on 3.2 million hectares of farmland, contributing to anti-Ravalomanana sentiment fueled by Rajoelina, who later canceled the deal.
Some—including Ravalomanana–claim that the new government is being funded in part by illegal lumber exports. More recently, members of the transitional government banned trade in rainforest timber, but there are some concerns that this ban will not be enforceable given the continued political instability, reports MongaBay.
The damage already done “demonstrates that long-term conservation success depends on the overall political stability of a country and in turn on the steady improvement of the lives of its citizens,” wrote Rowan Moore Gerety in wildmadagascar.org last year.
“It’s difficult to work without a state,” said Guy Suzon Ramangason, director general of the organization that manages many of the national parks, recently told the New York Times.
Perhaps that situation will be rectified. In May Rajoelina announced that elections will be held in late 2010, in which he will not be running. Until then, it unlikely that conservation will receive adequate attention—from either Madagascar’s government or international donors.
Photo Credit: “Lemur behind the mesh” courtesy of flickr user Tambako the Jaguar -
Afghanistan’s Mineral Wealth: Gold Mine, Curse, or Illusion?
›June 15, 2010 // By Schuyler NullAccording to The New York Times, U.S. officials have discovered a veritable bonanza of heavy metals and rare earth minerals in Afghanistan that have the potential “to fundamentally alter the Afghan economy and perhaps the Afghan war itself”:The previously unknown deposits — including huge veins of iron, copper, cobalt, gold and critical industrial metals like lithium — are so big and include so many minerals that are essential to modern industry that Afghanistan could eventually be transformed into one of the most important mining centers in the world, the United States officials believe.
Reaction to the announcement has been mixed, with both Foreign Policy and Wired bloggers expressing skepticism about the timing of the announcement – in the midst of a difficult period of the war – and pointing out that the “discovery” is old news.
Others have expressed hope that the find, worth an estimated $1 trillion, might provide an injection of much-needed capital into one of the world’s worst economies. Environmental security expert Saleem Ali of the University of Vermont told Public Radio International’s The World that “there’s an opportunity now for the country to develop outside of a predominantly drug-dependent economy and if properly managed the minerals could provide a catalyst for all kinds of other activities as well.”
Afghanistan’s rare earth minerals in particular might prove to be extremely valuable as global demand continues to grow for these critical components of renewable energy technology and advanced electronics. The New York Times reports that an internal Pentagon memo says Afghanistan has the potential to become the “Saudi Arabia of lithium”:Just this month, American geologists working with the Pentagon team have been conducting ground surveys on dry salt lakes in western Afghanistan where they believe there are large deposits of lithium. Pentagon officials said that their initial analysis at one location in Ghazni Province showed the potential for lithium deposits as large of those of Bolivia, which now has the world’s largest known lithium reserves.
The existence of mineral reserves in Afghanistan is not new news, nor is foreign interest in them (see our coverage of Chinese copper investments at Aynak earlier this year). But the size of these resources warrants attention and raises new questions about the possibility of the unstable country falling victim to the natural resource curse – remaining mired in poverty while generating billions of dollars for an elite few.
Mineral wealth has a long history of fueling conflict in unstable countries, such as Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The DRC’s mining laws – which, like Afghanistan’s, were designed by the World Bank – have not prevented violent struggle to control the country’s valuable resources, as described by John Katunga in ECSP Report 12.
How can Afghanistan’s newly discovered mineral resources be developed without funding insurgents or fueling new conflicts? USAID’s Minerals and Conflict Toolkit offers a start with a set of recommendations and discrete steps that development agencies should take to avoid exacerbating the links between mining, valuable resources, and violent conflict.
Stay tuned for more analysis on Afghanistan’s development, resource curse dynamics, and what this all means for the continuing conflict.
Sources: Foreign Policy, National Public Radio, The New York Times, Public Radio International, Wired.
Photo Credit: “Remote Sensing Survey 2006” courtesy of the U.S. Geological Survey. -
Book Review: ‘Climate Conflict: How Global Warming Threatens Security and What to Do About It’ by Jeffrey Mazo
›June 8, 2010 // By Dan AsinThe heated back-and-forth over climate conflict in the blogosphere and popular press prompts the questions: In the debate over the security threat of a warming planet, who is spewing the hot air? Does climate change precipitate conflict, and if so, who is most at risk?
In Climate Conflict: How Global Warming Threatens Security and What to Do About It, Jeffrey Mazo unabashedly argues that weak–but not yet failed–states are at the greatest risk of climate-driven conflict. Packed into only 166 pages, the book takes readers on a crash course through climate science; 10,000 years of human-environmental history; case studies of the pre-modern South Pacific and modern-day Colombia, Indonesia, and Darfur; and analysis of geopolitical instability and stressors. This tour d’horizon all builds up to one point: Global warming and climate change threaten our security.
Key to Mazo’s work is the important but oft-overlooked insight that it is not the magnitude of climate change, but the difference between the rate of climate change and a society’s ability to adapt that threatens stability. He also confronts the all-too-common assertion that accepting climate change as a threat multiplier absolves individuals of culpability, and is explicit that intrastate–rather than interstate–conflict is the norm.
The Weakest Are Not the Greatest Threat
Mazo weaves threads of non-traditional and human security throughout the text, asserting that “there is no real contradiction between humanitarian and security goals” (pg. 132). However, his primary concern is the security of the nation-state and the international system. He argues that the next two to four decades are the most relevant time for strategic planning.
Within this context, Mazo claims global warming’s central security challenge will be the threat it poses to stability in states that are either unable or unwilling to adapt. Few will be surprised, therefore, when he says weak, fragile, and failing states appear the most vulnerable.
Mazo suggests that already fragile or failed states lying in climate-sensitive areas–namely a handful of states in sub-Saharan Africa, plus Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan–are the most likely to experience increased volatility as a result of warming-induced climate change. Yet he departs from received wisdom when he suggests that global warming’s greatest threat to international security is actually how it will impact more resilient states like Burkina Faso, Colombia, and Indonesia.
Precisely because they are less at risk, the onset of instability in these states would have a greater impact. Exacerbating conflict or instability in a fragile or failed state, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, would not ripple through the international security framework in dramatically new ways. But the results of new conflict or instability in relatively stable states, such as Colombia, would. Mazo believes that the greater quantitative and qualitative impact of conflict in more resilient states renders them greater areas of concern.
Climate Factor Is One of Many
In no instance will climate change be the sole factor in conflict or state collapse. In already fragile or failed states, such as Sudan, instability is the product of a complex range of factors–political, social, and economic–many of which are non-environmental. “No single factor is necessary or sufficient,” writes Mazo (p. 126).
As it becomes increasingly pronounced, climate change may play a larger role in contributing toward volatility and instability. It is unlikely, however, to precipitate conflict where other risk factors do not already exist.
Adaptation Is Key
To address the threat to otherwise stable countries, Mazo advocates improving their latent capacity for adaptation. Good governance, rule of law, education, economic development: each is a key factor in a state’s ability to adapt. Variations across these factors may explain why death tolls from natural disasters in Bangladesh have fallen in recent years while those in Burma have risen.
Adaptation efforts should prioritize weak or recovering states that “have proved able to cope but are at particular risk,” Mazo writes (p. 133). Failing or failed states are either too susceptible to other conflict factors or too far advanced along the path of instability for adaptation to be of use to forestalling threats to international security. His argument is not to consign those in the most dire circumstances to a perpetual state of misery but, from a security perspective, to focus constrained resources on states where they will have the greatest impact. In states with the capacity to effectively absorb inflows, adaptation can preempt conflict, not simply reduce it.
Mazo does not ignore mitigation, and recognizes that it works in tandem with adaptation: Mitigation “is the only way of avoiding the most dire consequences of global warming, which would exceed the capacity of individuals, nations or the international system to adapt,” he notes (p. 124). Nevertheless, he argues that mitigation strategies “take much longer to bear fruit,” and that a certain amount of warming in the short- to medium-term is inevitable (p. 133). Against this warming, resilient adaptation is our best defense.
Case in Point: Indonesia
One otherwise stable state whose stability is threatened by climate change is Indonesia. Having suffered political and social unrest following the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and sectarian violence following Timor Leste’s independence in 1999, Indonesia avoided both failure and collapse to emerge as a flawed but vibrant democracy and Southeast Asia’s largest economy.
Indonesia is now home to the largest Muslim population in the world and is a key to regional security, yet its success “is potentially threatened by climate change,” writes Mazo; “food insecurity will be the greatest risk” (pg. 116).
Annual mean temperatures in Indonesia rose by 0.3°C between 1990 and 2005, and are predicted to rise an additional 0.36-0.47°C by 2020. The rainy seasons will shorten, increasing the risk of either flooding or drought. El Nino weather patterns–which in 1997 damaged over 400,000 hectares of rice and coffee, cocoa, and rubber cash crops–are expected to become more extreme and frequent in the future.
Climate change will further widen the substantial wealth gap between Indonesia’s rich and poor and, when it has differential impacts in different regions, “could lead to a revival of separatism” (pg. 117). While Mazo says threats from climate change will not be enough to push Indonesia into instability by themselves, he warns that if other destabilizing factors begin to emerge, “the added stress of climate change could accelerate the trend” (pg. 117).
Short and Sweet
Unlike some popular commentators on climate and security, Mazo does not confound brevity with hyperbole. While its concise format best lends itself to policymakers, students, and curious readers who are short on time, Climate Conflict’s content and its compendium of more than 320 citations make it deserving of a spot on everyone’s bookshelf. -
Rare Earth: A New Roadblock for Sustainable Energy?
›June 7, 2010 // By Wilson Center Staff
The 2010 National Security Strategy emphasizes that energy independence is part of a larger strategy for national security, stating, “As long as we are dependent on fossil fuels, we need to ensure the security and free flow of global energy resources.”
However, the alternatives to fossil fuels–such as wind energy, hybrid vehicles, and energy-efficient light bulbs–could also lead to dependence on international resources. They require minerals known as rare earth elements or minerals (REEs). REEs are required for producing the magnets necessary for a variety of goods, including precision-guided munitions, computer hard drives, lasers, communication and radar systems, satellites, and color televisions.
But China has a virtual lock on the production of REEs. In response, U.S. policymakers requested the GAO produce a detailed assessment of REEs in the U.S. defense supply chain as part of the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act. At the same time, the Pentagon is changing its policies regarding acquiring and stockpiling REEs.
Demand for Rare Earth Predicted to Rise
CEO Mark Smith of Molycorp Minerals, a U.S. rare earth mining operation, told HardAssetsInvestor.com:Today the largest use of these magnets is in hard disk drives… We believe that may be changing as hybrid cars become more popular and the use of wind turbines becomes more widespread. Clearly, on a volumetric basis, these two new clean energy technologies could easily overtake hard disk drives in terms of the volume of permanent rare earth magnets required.
Despite their name, REEs are not necessarily rare–known stocks and demand vary widely by element–but supplies of some key elements are short, reports Robin Bromby of The Australian.
China Corners the Rare Earth Market
The growing attention paid to REE supply stems more from the location of mining and production facilities rather than pure scarcity concerns. According to the GAO assessment, China produced 97 percent of rare earth oxides in 2009, and it has established economic protections on rare earth exports. The United States Magnet Material Association has estimated that China’s consumption of rare earth materials will outpace its supply between 2012-2015.
“What we need to be careful of is that we don’t unknowingly change our dependence on foreign oil to a new dependence on Chinese rare earths,” Molycorp’s Smith told HardAssetsInvestor.com. While new technologies may change the type of battery used in hybrids, “the one thing that cannot change in electric vehicles or hybrid vehicles is the use of permanent rare earth magnets in the motors and generators. There is simply no substitute for those magnets,” said Smith.
U.S. Seeks Secure Supplies
Given the lack of substitutes, the United States is attempting to secure access to REEs. Known deposits exist in the United States, Australia, Brazil, India, Canada, South Africa, and Greenland. However, in order for the United States to procure secure access to REEs, they must both acquire mines and processing facilities for the multi-stage production process, which today takes place almost entirely in China.
The GAO estimates it may take up to 15 years for the United States to produce a finished product. In that time, Chinese consumption is expected to have vastly increased and demand for certain REEs may be very high.
Washington is taking this threat seriously. As pointed out by CNAS’ Christine Parthemore, the 180-day turnaround time on the GAO’s rare earth assessment was considerably shorter than for other assessments, including a plan for operational use of biofuels.
The Pentagon is revamping its stockpiling practices, reducing bureaucratic barricades to changing quotas, broadening buying options, and growing the array of stockpiled resources, the Wall Street Journal reported, adding:The rising competition for raw materials has sparked fears in the U.S. military that some materials that once seemed abundant could suddenly become hard to get at any price. In 2008 the military suspended or limited sales of 13 commodities it had previously considered excess. Last year it added 14 materials to its list of resources it considers for stockpiling, including specialty steels, lithium and some rare-earth elements, taking the total to 68. More additions are expected, said Ms. Stead of the Defense National Stockpile Center.
While it seeks secure supplies of REEs, the United States, and the defense community in particular, should take heed of the long history of minerals and conflicts around the world. Global demand for certain minerals has supported combatants in conflict areas; for example, control of coltan mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, while producing only 1 percent of global supply, played a significant role in that country’s civil war.
The switch to alternative transportation fuels could similarly produce new patterns of global resource demand that spur or support conflict–a phenomena that will be explored in an upcoming ECSP event, “Backdraft: The Conflict Potential of Climate Mitigation and Adaptation.”
On the other hand, done correctly, mineral extraction could be a way to break the “resource curse” and increase cooperation rather than conflict. In Pakistan, “development and maintenance of an extractive mineral industry could revolutionize the Waziristan economy and infrastructure in the long-term,” says Natural Security, which could provide “an incentive for local cooperation.”
Ultimately, the way that the United States seeks to slake its hunger for resources will determine whether it can stockpile its way to security.
Tara Innes is a PhD student at the University of Maryland, studying conflict-environment linkages and an intern with ECSP.
Photo Credit: Adaptation of Periodic Table, courtesy Flickr user Destinys Agent -
New Security Challenges in Obama’s Grand Strategy
›June 4, 2010 // By Schuyler NullPresident Obama’s National Security Strategy (NSS), released last week, reinforces a commitment to the whole of government approach to defense, and highlights the diffuse challenges facing the United States, including international terrorism, globalization, and economic upheaval.
Following the lead of the Quadrennial Defense Review released earlier this year, the NSS for the first time since the Clinton years prominently features non-traditional security concerns such as climate change, population growth, food security, and resource management:Climate change and pandemic disease threaten the security of regions and the health and safety of the American people. Failing states breed conflict and endanger regional and global security… The convergence of wealth and living standards among developed and emerging economies holds out the promise of more balanced global growth, but dramatic inequality persists within and among nations. Profound cultural and demographic tensions, rising demand for resources, and rapid urbanization could reshape single countries and entire regions.
By acknowledging the myriad causes of instability along with more “hard” security issues such as insurgency and nuclear weapons, Obama’s national security strategy takes into account the “soft” problems facing critical yet troubled states – such as Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and Somalia – which include demographic imbalances, food insecurity, and environmental degradation.
Not surprisingly, Afghanistan in particular is highlighted as an area where soft power could strengthen American security interests. According to the strategy, agricultural development and a commitment to women’s rights “can make an immediate and enduring impact in the lives of the Afghan people” and will help lead to a “strong, stable, and prosperous Afghanistan.”
The unique demographic landscape of the Middle East, which outside of Africa has the fastest growing populations in the world, is also given intentional consideration. “We have a strategic interest in ensuring that the social and economic needs and political rights of people in this region, who represent one of the world’s youngest populations, are met,” the strategy states.
Some critics of that strategy warn that the term “national security” may grow to encompass so much it becomes meaningless. But others argue the administration’s thinking is simply a more nuanced approach that acknowledges the complexity of today’s security challenges.
In a speech on the strategy, Secretary of State Clinton said that one of the administration’s goals was “to begin to make the case that defense, diplomacy, and development were not separate entities either in substance or process, but that indeed they had to be viewed as part of an integrated whole and that the whole of government then had to be enlisted in their pursuit.”
Compare this approach to President Bush’s 2006 National Security Strategy, which began with the simple statement, “America is at war” and focused very directly on terrorism, democracy building, and unilateralism.
Other comparisons are also instructive. The Bush NSS mentions “food” only once (in connection with the administration’s “Initiative to End Hunger in Africa”) and does not mention population, demography, agriculture, or climate change at all. In contrast, the 2010 NSS mentions food nine times, population and demography eight times, agriculture three times, and climate change 23 times – even more than “intelligence,” which is mentioned only 18 times.
For demographers, development specialists, and environmental conflict specialists, the inclusion of “new security” challenges in the National Security Strategy, which had been largely ignored during the Bush era, is a boon – an encouraging sign that soft power may return to prominence in American foreign policy.
The forthcoming first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review by the State Department will help flesh out the strategic framework laid out by the NSS. It is expected to provide more concrete policy for integrating defense, diplomacy, and development. Current on-the-ground examples like USDA embedding in Afghanistan, stepped-up development aid to Pakistan, and the roll-out of the administration’s food security initiative, “Feed the Future,” are encouraging signs that the NSS may already be more than just rhetoric.
Update: The Bush 91′ and 92’ NSS also included environmental considerations, in part due to the influence of then Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates.
Sources: Center for Global Development, CNAS, Los Angeles Times, State Department, USAID, White House, World Politics Review.
Photo Credit: “Human, Food, and Demographic Security” collage by Schuyler Null from “Children stop tending to the crop to watch the patrol” courtesy of flickr user isafmedia, “Combing Wheat” courtesy of flickr user AfghanistanMatters, and “Old Town Sanaa – Yemen 49” courtesy of flickr user Richard Messenger. -
Can Food Security Stop Terrorism?
›May 28, 2010 // By Schuyler NullUSAID’s “Feed the Future” initiative is being touted for its potential to help stabilize failing states and dampen simmering civil conflicts. Speaking at a packed symposium on food security hosted by the Chicago Council last week, USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah called food security “the foundation for peace and opportunity – and therefore a foundation for our own national security.”
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Securing Food in Insecure Areas
›May 25, 2010 // By Dan Asin“Of the 1 billion people who are in food-stressed situations today, a significant proportion live in conflict-ridden countries,” said Raymond Gilpin of the U.S. Institute of Peace at last Thursday’s launch of USAID’s Feed the Future initiative. “Most of them live in fear for their lives, in uncertain environments, and without clear hope for a better tomorrow.”
According to data from the World Food Programme and the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database, of the countries with moderately to very high hunger rates in 2009, nearly a quarter experienced violent conflict in the previous year, and nearly half in the preceding two decades.
Gilpin said those working toward food security need to develop “conflict-sensitive” approaches, because “a lot of fundamentals that underlie this problem have a lot to do with conflict.” He noted several points, from production to purchasing power, at which conflict enters to disrupt the farm to mouth food cycle:- Production: Be it forced or voluntary, internal or external, conflict often results in displacement. Farmers are not exempt, and when they’re not on their land they cannot produce.
- Delivery: “Food security isn’t always an issue of food availability; it’s an issue of accessibility,” he said. “When violent conflict affects a community or a region…it destroys infrastructure and weakens institutions.”
- Market access: In conflict zones, it is solitary or competing armed contingents, rather than the market’s invisible hand, that control access to supplies. “Groups who usually have the monopoly of force, control livelihoods and food and services,” he said.
- Purchasing power: Conflict disrupts economic activity, degrading both incomes and real wealth. Those remaining in the conflict area suffer from fewer opportunities to conduct business, while those choosing to migrate relinquish their assets. In instances where food is available to purchase, conflict reduces the number of individuals who can afford it.
Photo Credit: World Food Programme distribution site in Afghanistan, courtesy Flickr user USAID Afghanistan. -
‘NATO 2020’ Recommendations Avoid “New Security” Challenges
›May 25, 2010 // By Schuyler NullA recently released report, NATO 2020, outlines expert recommendations for the alliance’s new strategic concept. However, while pointing to a nighttime satellite image of the globe at a Wilson Center conference last week, Professor Peter Liotta of Salve Regina University said the report focuses too much on conventional self-defense, when most of the new security challenges of the 21st century will come from areas of the world “where the lights are out.”
In an interview with New Security Beat, Liotta criticized NATO 2020’s emphasis on what he sees as a reactive, rather than a proactive, stance. By ignoring “new security” vulnerabilities such as environmental and demographic challenges, NATO may end up creating more threats for itself down the line, he said.
The report briefly acknowledges that demographic change and environmental degradation represent sources of uncertainty in forecasting global trends. However, neither are included as major threats to the alliance. Instead, the authors say the most probable threats are nuclear or non-nuclear armed ballistic missiles, terror attacks, and cyber intrusion.
Discussions about non-traditional security vulnerabilities often produce contentious and conflicting viewpoints, which makes it easier to ignore them, said Liotta. However, it is important for NATO to realize that security threats – even more conventional ones – do not exist in isolation.
Liotta said the continued focus on NATO’s Article 5, the invocation of collective self-defense, overshadows other important foundations of the alliance. For example, Article 2, which encourages “promoting conditions of stability,” could be invoked to help the alliance address non-traditional security threats.
In his presentation, Liotta, formerly of the U.S. Naval War College, cited mass migration, water scarcity, and low probability, high-risk events, such as rapid sea-level rise from Arctic ice melt, as examples of challenges that NATO should be preparing to meet. He also drew attention to the security challenges of a burgeoning global population, saying that rapid growth and urbanization will produce 600 cities with more than one million people by 2025.
Such extreme events as the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan, China, which killed about 90,000 people and left five million homeless, might be a symptom of the strain our growing population has placed on the Earth’s natural systems, said Liotta. Scientists point out that an earthquake of such magnitude has never been seen in Sichuan and that large construction projects – particularly a large dam and reservoir that lie within 550 yards of the fault line – have likely had a considerable effect on local geology.
In Europe’s current deployment-adverse, difficult fiscal environment, it is perhaps understandable that NATO planners would focus on concrete threats rather than emerging vulnerabilities. But, as Liotta argues, the consequences for ignoring these new security challenges could be no less dire.
Sources: Daily Mail, Foreign Policy, NATO, Telegraph.
Photo Credit: “The Night Lights of Planet Earth” courtesy of flickr user woodleywonderworks.
