As relations between the United States and China become increasingly acrimonious, reducing methane emissions from oil and gas operations remains an exceptional arena where respectful engagement between both countries endures.

Methane is a highly-intensive, short-lived climate pollutant, and it is responsible for about 30 percent of current global warming. Two-fifths of the global total of human-caused methane derives from fossil fuel production, including oil and gas. And the U.S. and China play an outsized role. The US leads the world in oil and gas production and sectoral methane emissions, while China ranks in the top five producers. China is also the global leader in total methane releases, including agriculture, livestock, coal production, and waste emissions.

Since two nations are snarling at each other over electric vehicles, critical minerals, TikTok, Taiwan, Russia, and more, one might assume that this is also the case with methane. But they began two decades ago to review uses of advanced technologies to better measure methane emissions—and mitigate them through cost-effective steps.  

Such discussions have continued and accelerated over the past year through bilateral national meetings on climate change held in Beijing and California. These sessions generated broad agreements to explore further collaboration over methane, as well as other short-lived climate pollutants such as hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). The friendly vibes continued through both the Dubai COP28 meetings and in recent climate diplomacy, leading to plans for a second Methane and Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases Summit at COP29 in Baku. Methane also has emerged as a potential area of subnational cooperation in expanding climate deliberations involving China and the state of California.

While none of this activity will resolve the climate challenge posed by methane any time soon,  this engagement demonstrates that global policy spheres where the United States and China seek common ground do remain.

Yet it is not global citizenship alone that is driving this process. Some of this momentum is linked to unique oil and gas sector opportunities. Vented or flared methane causes not only near-term climate damage, but it also represents waste of a non-renewable natural resource with energy value. An estimated two-fifths of methane losses could be eliminated with available technologies at no net-cost, reflecting modest implementation expenses and revenue from captured gas. Other sectors are likely more challenging, although reducing emissions from landfilled waste may present some comparable opportunities.

Performance Parallels

Another reason that the United States and China may be motivated to work together?  Their methane performance records to date have been modest. Both nations rank in the middle-of-the-pack among major oil and gas producers in terms of methane emissions per unit of produced energy, according to a 2024 International Energy Agency (IEA) report.

The IEA employs a mix of data sources and advanced measurement methods to assemble this annual scorecard on national methane intensity records. And while the similar scores for the US and China may be attributable to a wide range of geological, technical, and policy factors, they do provide a global performance bottom line that is more precise than traditional comparisons based on chronically unreliable national estimation measures. 

American and Chinese performance on oil and gas methane emissions remains far superior to many other leading producing nations, including Iraq, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and Turkmenistan.  But both countries fall well behind global leaders such as Norway, Saudi Arabia and Canada. Oil and gas sector methane emissions reached a global peak in 2019, but have remained close to that level since that time. Production increases during this period also suggest modest improvement in overall methane intensity.

Challenges Ahead

Both the United States and China have opportunities to close the methane emissions gap with leading nations in coming years, but neither nation has a straightforward path forward.  Both countries demonstrate a reluctance to reduce oil and gas production or demand, so future methane reductions will require more efficient stewardship both at drilling sites and other supply chain stages.

In the United States, decades of deference to state authority has produced a patchwork of policies designed to accommodate industry preference and maximize output. (States such as Colorado and New Mexico do offer exceptions to this trend.) And federal policy has advanced in fits and starts, with major policy pivots occurring across recent presidencies. The Biden Administration has prioritized the methane issue, however, and it is attempting to roll out a sequence of policies including emissions pricing, regulations, and industry subsidies, alongside updated measurement and monitoring.

If fully implemented, this comprehensive approach could position America to catch up to global leaders with far lower methane loss rates. Yet these new policies face a rapidly-expanding set of legal challenges from numerous production states and industry groups. They also could face fundamental political challenges depending on forthcoming election outcomes. 

Rigorous studies of American methane emissions do reveal enormous variation, both by industry  as well as by production basin; some firms and states appear to rival performance of global leaders, while others square with global laggards. Achieving uniform excellence in methane minimization remains an American aspiration, rather than a done deed.

In China, a series of national emission control plans have emphasized expanded deployment of leak detection and gas recovery technologies aimed at reducing flaring and venting. These efforts have been backed by industry leaders, including the China Oil and Gas Methane Alliance, with pledges to reduce emissions intensity and share growing technical expertise. This activity has some parallels with vows coming from American firms.

All of this is consistent with China’s growing emphasis on addressing short-lived climate pollutants, including its 2021 ratification of the Kigali Amendment on HFC transition—one year before the United States did so. However, China has balked thus far at joining the Global Methane Pledge (GMP), which is the primary international mechanism for fostering cross-national progress in reducing methane.  It remains unclear if this is merely a delay until China finalizes its domestic plans or instead represents serious opposition.

Launched in 2021 by the United States and European Union (EU), the GMP now includes 155 national members supporting efforts to reduce global methane emissions by at least 30 percent from 2020 levels by 2030. Unlike the Kigali Amendment, however, GMP membership lacks binding commitments and requires little formal effort. This not only makes China’s absence conspicuous, but also restricts deeper collaboration on the issue.

External Pressures

Whether working in partnership or going it alone, both the United States and China will face intensifying pressures to improve their methane records in coming years. Ongoing advances in measurement precision will make it increasingly difficult for individual nations, states, or firms to continue disguising their actual methane release records with lowball estimates. 

In turn, the European Union is extending its global leadership in reducing carbon emissions through border adjustments on imported goods to methane. European energy producers generally have strong methane records, and the EU will be further intensifying its regulatory oversight on them. Furthermore, because Europe now imports more than four-fifths of its oil and gas, the EU also is developing methane intensity limits for imported fuels, including potential financial penalties for failure to match European standards. The US could become a major partner in any emerging methane border adjustment process if it can sustain its fledgling pricing, regulatory, and advanced measurement regime and thereby demonstrate consistent performance excellence.  If it falters, it could be far more vulnerable to future trade penalties than other exporting nations with more robust methane records.

Closer links between global energy trade and climate policy could extend into methane, especially as these emissions gain saliency and national and industry performance continues to vary markedly. This trend could represent a major step forward in global methane stewardship, beginning with oil and gas but potentially expanding into other sectors. Indeed, methane could ultimately follow the Kigali playbook through establishing a systematic linkage between emissions control and cross-border trade.

Noting these possibilities in January 2024 at an Environmental Law Institute workshop on methane governance, Romina Picolotti, Director of Climate Policy of the Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development observed: “We can do this, but we will need the United States at the table. Obviously, yes, we will need China.”