Last month, headlines around the world heralded a breakthrough for international environmental cooperation. During ongoing ozone treaty negotiations in Rwanda, China broke with the developing world, agreeing with the United States to aggressively phase out hydrofluorocarbons, a significant global warming pollutant found in refrigerators and air conditioners. These changes are expected to make a big difference in combating climate change, mitigating half a Celsius degree of warming.

Alas, by November 9, the bright light of the Kigali agreement had dimmed. If campaign rhetoric is anything to go by, the burgeoning environmental leadership coalition between China and the United States may come to an end under the new U.S. administration. Does this mean progress in global environmental action is likely to stall for at least the next four years? Not necessarily.

Our new research, published in Global Environmental Politics, provides reasons to hope for Chinese leadership in particular. Though China is still an emerging economy, there are significant domestic drivers for action on environmental issues, ranging from mercury pollution to climate change. By contrast, India was a key player in delaying the Kigali agreement and use of hydrofluorocarbons is expected to surge there as more air conditioners come online.

To understand global environmental governance, there is a significant need to understand domestic factors driving environmental policy among the largest emitters – not just in the United States. Historically, the Global South has cooperated to secure financing and more favorable outcomes in environmental treaties. But across international environmental negotiations, long-standing cooperation among developing countries is breaking down. Increasingly, the South is split, with China now pushing for stronger environmental agreements and India more likely to side with some developing countries to delay. As the two largest emerging economies, these changes in India and China’s negotiating positions are likely to prove critical to environmental outcomes in the future, particularly if the United States resumes a laggard position in global governance.

We argue the Global South is increasingly split in international environmental negotiations because of differences in energy policy, development status, and the role of the scientific community. We developed this theory based on direct observations during negotiations of the Minamata Convention on Mercury and through interviewing numerous negotiators. We show that this theory also applies more broadly to ozone and climate change negotiations and could help understand how international environmental leadership may develop in the future.

Changes in Energy and Policy Processes

One explanation for the split between India and China is divergence in their domestic resources and regulatory politics, particularly on energy and air pollution. Both China and India, like most developing countries, have prioritized expanding their energy generation capacity. If the global community adopts difficult targets for emissions, whether on ozone, climate change, or mercury emissions, it could hinder this expansion.

Yet, China and India have vastly different future energy needs. China is essentially completely electrified, while in India a quarter of the population still has no access to electricity.

The Indian government has announced plans to double power generation capacity within the next 10 years and is continuing to invest heavily in coal as part of that effort. This reliance on coal makes emissions reductions more costly in India. Thus, India is arguing against new, stringent agreements.

By contrast, China is increasingly shifting away from coal. In 2013, China installed more non-coal than coal electricity sources for the first time in recent history. In part, coal has become less viable due to rising public concerns over air pollution. Consequently, the government has imposed tougher air quality regulations, which make coal more expensive to burn. In addition, China has shown a strong ability to profit from manufacturing new environmental technology, such as solar panels, which will have new markets as countries reduce emissions.

There are also large differences in each country’s domestic scientific and technical capacity. Scientific information can create shared narratives and form a basis for environmental action. For this reason, domestic science may have a strong influence on domestic regulation, and therefore on countries’ positions in international negotiations.

Direct input from scientists is an increasingly common part of China’s policymaking process. During the Minmata mercury negotiations the Chinese scientific community highlighted the extent of China’s local mercury challenges. Scientists were active and participated in developing new domestic emission standards. Some of the same scientists then served directly as part of the delegation to international negotiations.

In contrast, the Indian scientific community is less developed. Domestically, there have been relatively few studies on mercury impacts, for example. Furthermore, scientists and technical experts have less influence over environmental policy. This dynamic is reflected in India’s delegations to international environmental negotiations, with minimal scientific representation.

Split Consequences

Our findings suggest two potential levers to increase international cooperation: building scientific capacity in developing countries and aligning global requirements with domestic constraints. The latter point means that international negotiators and analysts should be attentive to what is possible given domestic regulation, resources, and development constraints.

Our research also suggests that after several decades of predominance, the North-South dichotomy in international environmental negotiations is breaking down. The Kigali and Minmata negotiations provide two examples of South-South divergence, but similar dynamics influence other negotiations, including those related to climate change.

Whether fracturing in the Southern coalition will lead to better environmental outcomes remains to be seen, but there are reasons to be hopeful. China’s statements at the climate conference in Marrakesh bode well for its continued leadership. One senior negotiator said that shifts in the U.S. position would not affect the country’s commitment to acting on environmental problems, and “it is global society’s will that all want to cooperate to combat climate change.” Even in India, where air quality has been a lower priority for many compared to development concerns, recent air pollution emergencies in Delhi have triggered an outcry that could be the start of a turnaround in popular sentiment.

It may be that we are witnessing a fundamental reorientation in global environmental governance, with the developing world taking a greater lead in action.