A window into what we are reading at the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program

Worsening Health Conditions in War-Torn Gaza (BBC) 

Water infrastructure in Gaza was already weak before the beginning of the war in 2023, but intensified conflict and siege of critical infrastructure the damage wreaked by Israel’s military forces on critical infrastructure (including water, energy, and food), has left 70% of the people in Gaza exposed to salinated and contaminated water. Traces of polio have been found in wastewater flowing both between displacement camp tents and in inhabited areas, and experts suggest that this water might be circulating. 

The war in Ukraine is likely to have immediate effects on many countries in the MENA region. Ukraine is an important global producer of sunflower oil and grain, and alongside Russia, it provides a third of the world’s wheat and barley. Russia’s invasion also will severely disrupt food transport logistics within Ukraine and across its borders due to the suspension of shipping from Ukraine’s commercial ports.

“We should not see people moving as a security threat. People do not move if they’ve got a better option. As a community, one of our responsibilities is to provide people with the options,” said Andrew Harper, Special Advisor to the UNHCR High Commissioner for Climate Action, at a discussion on human mobility, climate change, and conflict hosted at the 2021 Berlin Climate and Security Conference. “We need to ensure that projects and activities that have been put in place are not short term, but are geared up to be addressing the challenges that the world will be facing within five to ten years’ time.” 

That future wars will be fought over water, rather than oil, has become something of a truism, particularly with regard to the Middle East. It’s also one that most water experts have refuted time and time and time again. But while this preference for cooperation over conflict may (and emphasis on may) remain true of interstate disputes, this blanket aversion to the ‘water wars’ narrative fails to account for the rash of other water-related hostilities that are erupting across many of the world’s drylands. As neither full-on warfare nor issues that necessarily resonate beyond specific, sometimes isolated areas, these ‘grey zone’ clashes don’t seem to be fully registering in the broader discussion of water conflicts. In failing to adequately account for the volume of localized violence, the world is probably chronically underestimating the extent to which water insecurity is already contributing to conflict.

For years, analysts have disputed the extent of climate change’s role in conflict. But the nature of climate risks can stifle those looking to define them.

The Syrian civil war has raged for almost a decade now, and in the climate security community it can feel as if we’ve spent at least that long arguing about its causes. For every claim about the impact of extreme drought in the lead up to 2011, there’s been blowback, with some scholars arguing that the climate angle has been exaggerated at the expense of other causes of the conflict. And for every argument about rural-to-urban migration, there have been suggestions that its impact in precipitating protests has been overstated. Amid some overly forceful media assertion about the significance of climate change—and valid fears that invoking the environment might be seen as absolving guilty parties, despite efforts to highlight the regime’s ultimate culpability—climate security analysts have struggled to fully pinpoint climate’s precise contribution to the conflict. Cue uncertainty, controversy, and sometimes fierce academic polemics.