Indonesia is at the heart of the next decade of growth in Asia. It also is at the frontier of Chinese industry’s move to develop clean energy markets overseas. The Indonesian government and Chinese investors are aligned on a narrative of decarbonization, but on the ground, coal remains central.

As the world inches closer to the critical 1.5°C warming threshold, the demand for decisive climate leadership has never been more pressing. The US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on January 20, 2025 has left a leadership void. The confluence of these events also has raised the question of whether China can do more to fill the finance gap and help Global South countries decarbonize. 

Indonesia’s economy is on a roll. The archipelago nation harbors ambitions for 8% growth a year on its growing strength as an exporter of coal, palm oil, LNG, and stainless steel made from its booming nickel mining industry.

Investments from China are driving this growth—and run the gamut from traditionally dirty industries (mining, steel, and aluminum) to the crown jewels of Chinese clean energy tech: batteries,  electric vehicles (EVs), and solar panel production. In 2023, Xinyi Glass, the world’s largest solar PV panel maker, announced an 11.5 billion USD investment in a quartz sand processing plant in Indonesia. 

Cobalt, lithium, and copper are the critical minerals necessary to produce rechargeable lithium-ion-based batteries, and they are central to the electric vehicle (EV) supply chains in the energy transition. The importance of these minerals—and China’s strategic control of them—now compels the United States and its allies to diversify their supply chains for this essential resource.

A window into what we’re reading at the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program 

Room for Justice in Vietnam’s Energy Transition? (The Diplomat)

Vietnam’s crackdown on environmental leaders such as Hoàng Thị Minh Hồng on disputed charges raises significant concerns about human rights, transparency, and civil society’s role in its energy transition. These arrests have garnered international attention, but Vietnam’s government argues that they had nothing to do with environmental work. And while Hoàng and other activists have been released, their work remains curtailed. The message is clear: you’re not welcome here.

In April 2024, Thai government officials traveled to the Chinese provinces of Fujian and Guangdong with a single-point agenda – convincing the leading Chinese electric vehicle (EV) battery makers to invest in their country. Two months later, the global leader in the EV battery industry, China’s Contemporary Amperex Technology Limited (CATL), announced an initial investment of over $100 million to set up an assembly plant in collaboration with a local Thai state-owned company.

At the recent G20 meeting in June 2024 in Rio de Janeiro, United Nations Secretary General António Guterres gave an ominous warning: “Unless we limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius, spiraling disasters will devastate every economy.” Guterres implored governments to “speed-up the just transition from fossil fuels to renewables,” and declared that “the end of the fossil fuel age is inevitable.”

It is widely recognized that oil states are rarely democratic, and often conflict-prone. As these governments wind down their dependence on this toxic resource as part of broader global efforts to decarbonize, one might imagine that the end of oil will spell a better future for the citizens of oil-producing countries. Sadly, a look at the cases of fragile fossil fuel producing states (FFFPs) suggests that this may not be the case.