A significant increase in fisheries-related conflicts in the Indian Ocean since 2000 is heightening regional tensions. These conflicts have ranged from purely verbal and diplomatic disputes to armed attacks on fishing vessels by coast guards and navies. These disputes are most often low-intensity, but constitute true “wild card” scenarios in which competing powers’ navies reach the brink of engagement due to the actions of third parties that they neither command nor control.

Managing these frictions will require careful diplomacy and coordination of expectations around access rights to these valuable resources among an incredibly diverse set of stakeholders. In this context, the performance and resilience of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOS) will be key to effective transboundary management—and may even play a role in conflict prevention. But in order to do so, these regional organizations will need expanded capacity and dispute resolution mechanisms.

Given emergent challenges associated with overfishing, disputes over offshore energy deposits, and the myriad effects of climate change, regional fisheries management organizations may be effective institutions for heading off or managing conflicts in the Indian Ocean. These organizations are some of the less heralded international institutions for facilitating international cooperation and managing transboundary resources. But precisely because they are designed to facilitate the management of migratory species, they may be uniquely well-suited to addressing the new normal of markedly changed (and changing) ocean environments.

These competing demands on environmental resources are particularly acute in the Indian Ocean. More than 2 billion people live in countries bordering these waters. Many of the countries, especially those in Africa and South and Southeast Asia, are experiencing rapid economic and population growth. Over the past three decades, shipping traffic in the region has increased more than 300 percent, increasing concerns about pollution. Vast hydrocarbon deposits have been discovered from Mozambique to Myanmarand China is developing a vast network of deep water ports in India’s (and Australia’s) maritime backyard.

The Indian Ocean is also home to rich fisheries, which provide an important source of food and livelihood security for millions of people in coastal communities across the region. And as demand has skyrocketed for commercially important species such as tuna and tuna-like species (like swordfish and other large billfish) , so has fishing effort. Increasing threats such as overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, habitat destruction, and the heightening effects of climate change continue to undermine the sustainability of fisheries thereby threatening the livelihoods of the  human populations that depend on them.

The complex combination of high-tech, well-funded industrial fleets and artisanal and sport fishers attempting to exploit these fisheries further exacerbates these dynamics. Artisanal and sport fishers’ impacts are proportionately smaller, but their livelihoods and tourism dollars still matter. The countries of the region range from those with vast scientific, naval, and technical capacity to those with inadequate capacity to monitor and effectively patrol their territorial waters (22.2 km from the coastline), let alone their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs, 370.4 km from the coastline). 

One organization that could potentially head off or manage conflicts in the Indian Ocean is the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC). The IOTC is RFMO-mandated to manage tuna and tuna-like species in the Indian Ocean and adjacent seas through international cooperation, regulation, and scientific understanding. Fisheries are an essential source of economic and food security for Developing Coastal States (DCS) and island states in the region, with tuna production alone in the region estimated to exceed $2 billion annually.

The Tuna Commission has four key responsibilities: 1) collect, analyze, and disseminate information regarding tuna stocks in the region; 2) encourage and coordinate research and development activities; 3) adopt Conservation and Management Measures (CMM) to ensure the conservation of stocks; and 4) consider the economic, social, and legal aspects of fisheries based on stocks, keeping in mind the interests and rights of Developing Coastal States.

In recent years, the IOTC has focused most of its energy on issues of overfishing, member disputes, and commission capacity building. However, one area that has not seen marked development relates to developing dispute resolution mechanisms. Among the many committees and working groups that inform the Tuna Commission, no entity is tasked with investigating or resolving disputes between member states. In fact, while the IOTC agreement permits the formation of subcommissions to promote cooperation on the management of stocks, to date, member states have not proposed any such subcommission.

Advantages of a Dispute Resolution Mechanism

Developing the IOTC’s dispute resolution mechanism would be beneficial for at least two reasons. Robust co-management institutions for transboundary resources help promote cooperative relations between member states, even when disputes arise over issues that have nothing to do with the resources themselves. Research on transboundary river treaties shows a robust conflict-suppressing effect as the treaties include more institutional features like dispute resolution mechanisms. Related research suggests that these institutions perform particularly well when the underlying resource base is highly variable, as is the case with migratory fish stocks. More research is needed into the efficacy of RFMOs in particular to see if they have similar conflict-suppressing effects.

Another benefit relates to how well-informed disputing parties are. When disputing parties are scientifically literate and made aware of natural resource trends, a dispute resolution mechanism can also ensure that the conflict’s resolution considers—rather than ignores—the state and future of those resources. Dispute resolution that results in mismanagement doesn’t just affect fish populations; it can precipitate social and economic consequences that create new problems and disputes—this time over more scarce resources.

At present, the IOTC does not have a strong track record of managing fisheries conflicts, and the organization still could benefit from enhanced technical capacity, especially on the part of lower-income member-states. This is not to say that the IOTC does not have accomplishments to boast or the capacity to improve. The Commission has been praised for improved regulations of large-scale driftnets, fish aggregating devices (human-made objects designed to attract the attention of fished species), and harvest control rules.

However, Indian Ocean fisheries are increasingly stressed. And due to climate change, the underlying species are increasingly on the move. RFMOs in general, and the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission in particular, may provide a useful architecture around which transnational governance of these critical resources can resolve competing claims and prevent their escalation into hotspots of violent conflict.