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More EU in the Arctic and More Arctic in the EU?
The Arctic is ground zero for climate change. Warming in the region is occurring at three times the rate of the global average and September Arctic sea-ice is now declining at a rate of 13 percent per decade. However, the reverse is also true. The complex changes taking place in the Arctic are having profound effects on the rest of the world, and major economies are taking note.
Engagement in the Arctic is most often done through Arctic-focused policies and strategies such as the 2013 U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, the 2019 U.S.C.G. Arctic Strategic Outlook, or last year’s Strategic Approach for Arctic Homeland Security from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. In recent years, there has been a surge of Arctic strategies and narrative-building by non-Arctic actors to legitimize their presence in Arctic governance. However, the actions of some non-Arctic states and actors demonstrate that specific internal policies and foreign policy strategies not focused on the Arctic can also have an impact on Arctic governance.
A prime example of this is the climate and energy policies and actions outlined in the European Green Deal (EGD). The Arctic is not a central focus of the EGD, but the deal and subsequent legislative package—aimed at transforming the European Union into a carbon neutral economic powerhouse—will have consequences for the region that rival that of Arctic-focused policies and illustrate how other (non-)Arctic actors could rethink their environmental policies and impacts alongside their Arctic policies/strategies.
Climate urgency as foreign policy
Countries are slowly realizing that the question of decarbonizing fast and efficiently is not just an environmental issue—it is also a foreign policy issue. To meet emissions targets and avoid a worst-case scenario, future climate policies will need to produce seismic effects. The Glasgow Climate Pact—adopted by the Parties at COP26—calls on states to accelerate adoption of green policies and energy efficiency measures and phase-out coal power and inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. For this to work, decoupling economic growth from carbon-heavy and environmentally damaging activities must become a key feature of industrialized nations’ policymaking toolbox.
The EU is not waiting for other countries to take action. And importantly, the changes it is making internally to decarbonize its market will have consequences that reverberate beyond its 27 Member States.
As the Arctic environment and inhabitants withstand the worst of the climate crisis, the European Union is seeking to cement its role as a key leader in Arctic affairs. From a European environmental policy perspective, the most effective way to mitigate disruptive changes in the Arctic is to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The Joint Communication on A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic—the recent update to the EU’s Arctic Policy—recognizes climate change as “the most comprehensive threat” the Arctic faces and includes a focus on sustainable development. In this updated Arctic policy, the EU has undertaken controversial commitments such as not investing in new fossil fuel development in the Arctic and around the globe.
The focus on sustainable development does not mark a radical change of direction for the European Union. Indeed, sustainable development has been a key component of the EU’s environmental action since the EU’s early days. What is new is Brussels’ realization of the foreign policy potential of environmental action.
A green “Brussels Effect” in the Arctic
As the biggest economic market in the world, internal EU standards have external reach. Known as the “Brussels Effect,” the EU has the capacity to act as a global regulatory power in key areas such as environmental law by enacting unilateral regulations that impact other jurisdictions. The EU’s broad competences mean that decisions made in Brussels can and will impact the Arctic at large—not only the European Arctic. In short, the EU’s internal legislative changes could be as consequential to the Arctic as Arctic-focused EU policy.
As a global regulator for environmental and economic standards, the EU plays a role in the development and implementation of sustainable development, both as a principle in guiding international and domestic law and as a discursive tool in international relations. Recently, the EU proposed and partly adopted a broad range of environmental, climate, and circularity policy actions, largely encompassed within the EGD package. The EGD’s objective is to “transform the EU into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy, where there are no net emissions of GHG in 2050 and where economic growth is decoupled from resource use.”
Legislative changes to the EU’s climate-energy framework and greener policy developments, such as the Fit-for-55 package, have already had an impact on how the EU positions itself as an Arctic actor. From less dependence on Arctic hydrocarbons to encouraging the development of renewable energy and green partnership, the overhaul of the EU’s energy system is forcing non-EU partners to rethink their regulatory frameworks to access the EU’s energy market. If the EGD internal regulatory changes achieve their objectives, they will also impact the EU’s Arctic footprint. While the EU is often caught between acting as a climate leader while still being dependent on Arctic energy resources, as a foreign policy tool the EGD provides the means to solve this complex paradox. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions also means importing/buying less oil and gas from Russia and Norway.
The EU’s green transformation may also introduce new challenges to the EU-Artic relationship. The EU should consider the potential of local impacts of renewable energy production in the Arctic, shifting to electric and mass transit modes of transport, and other instances where Indigenous communities and sparsely populated areas may bear higher costs of transformations as compared to their urban counterparts.
Overall, the bold climate and energy policies and actions at the core of the European Green Deal may provide an example for other Arctic actors to rethink their environmental policies in tandem with their Arctic strategies or policies. The EGD internal transformation should enable the EU to make sustainable development a true characteristic of the EU’s socioeconomic system—and thus of the EU-Arctic nexus—rather than using the sustainable development vocabulary as an abstract principle or as a way to hide problematic trade-offs. Could this also be the next step for the United States and a new, comprehensive Arctic strategy?
Read More:
- Tip of the Iceberg: Polar Ice Loss Affects the Planet
- 21st Century Diplomacy: Foreign Policy is Climate Policy
- Integrating Conflict Prevention and Climate Change in U.S. Foreign Policy and Development Assistance
Romain Chuffart is a DurhamARCTIC PhD candidate at Durham Law School, Durham University (United Kingdom), and a Research Associate and Leadership Group member at The Arctic Institute – Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, Washington DC.
Andreas Raspotnik is an Austrian Marshall Plan Fellow at the Wilson Center, Washington DC, and a Senior Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker (Norway).
Sources: European Comission, New Security Beat, The Brussels Effect, The Hill, The Polar Journal, United States Coast Guard, United States Department of Homeland Security, United Nations, White House, Wilson Center.
Photo Credit: Press conference by European Commissioner Virginijus Sinkevicius on the new Arctic Strategy in Brussels, Belgium, courtesy of Alexandros Michailidis, Shutterstock.com.