“It seems like the news is always bad, right?” observed retired climate and atmospheric scientist James Kossin in a BBC interview last autumn.

Kossin was describing how climate change is weakening the wind shear patterns that have helped lessen the impacts of tropical cyclones in the United States. And, indeed, there is mounting evidence for his observation.

Climate change will amplify tropical cyclone risk in several ways, and it is a process that is already underway. These changes also are not easily reversed. Storms are reaching greater peak intensities, rapidly intensifying in ways that are difficult to predict, moving more slowly, and able to carry more moisture. The combination of these factors elevates the risk of catastrophic winds and rainfall.

This trend is alarming for all highly exposed countries—and especially so in places also grappling with political unrest or ongoing violent conflict. Our new study published in the Journal of Peace Research shows that the risk of conflict escalation following tropical cyclone hazard event is not inevitable. Yet this risk is particularly concerning because it tends to occur where institutional capacity is weakest and people are most vulnerable.

Escalating Exposure in Vulnerable Contexts

Recent events in conflict- and cyclone-affected countries like Haiti, Myanmar, and the Philippines starkly illustrate the potential consequences of tropical cyclones in a warming climate.

Unusually warm waters likely contributed to the rapid intensification of the 2008 Cyclone Nargis, which surged from a Category 1 to a Category 4 storm in just one day before making landfall in Myanmar. The country’s long history of conflict hampered its preparedness and response efforts, contributing to the tragic loss of 130,000 lives.

In the Philippines, frequent exposure to tropical cyclones already has motivated investment in adaptation and preparedness. Yet in that nation’s conflict-affected Mindanao island group, weak infrastructure, high poverty rates, and illegal mining and deforestation contributed to the large loss of life and the decimation of livelihoods when Super Typhoon Bopha—a storm of unprecedented intensity in the region—struck in December of 2012.

Haiti’s residents have endured a series of compounding disasters in recent decades, including Hurricane Matthew, which brought sustained winds of up to 145 mph, torrential rains, and devastating storm surges. The country also faces continuing political instability and escalating gang violence that have caused thousands of casualties, created widespread displacement, closed ports, restricted mobility, and crippled the economy. These governance challenges have hindered recovery from past disasters and left Haiti ill-prepared for future storms.

“If a hurricane were to hit Haiti,” Prospery Raymond, leader of an NGO consortium in Port-au-Prince, warned last year, “it will have a catastrophic effect.”

Vulnerable Places Face Conflict Escalation Following Tropical Cyclones

Disaster preparedness, responses to hazard exposure, and conflict dynamics all hinge on the quality and effectiveness of institutions. Overall, our study finds that conflict escalation, particularly increased one-sided violence against civilians, is more likely in areas directly impacted by tropical cyclones. Regions outside the storm-affected zones, on the other hand, tend to experience de-escalation. And in contexts with even moderately cohesive institutions, overall violence is less likely to escalate—and may even decrease after a storm.

The gradual and localized escalation of violence we see in tropical cyclone affected areas—especially in weaker states—aligns with conflict pathways triggered by failed or incomplete disaster recovery. Yet failures in disaster risk reduction and response do not only harm social and economic welfare. Our findings suggest that they also may increase vulnerability to future political violence.

Where violence de-escalates—especially in settings with effective governments—other mechanisms may take precedence, such as the re-allocation of military and financial resources towards disaster response, or efforts to improve a group’s local or international image. However, because tropical cyclone-exposed regions often see increased violence, we also see that this restraint is not guaranteed to persist, especially when it comes to actions taken against civilians.

Indeed, our data highlight how a conflict may evolve following a tropical cyclone—both across contexts, and over time. For instance, following Typhoon Bopha in the Philippines in 2012, both the New People’s Army and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front briefly ceased to wage violence. The latter group even actively collaborated with the government on relief efforts. Yet in this case, the lull in armed violence was fleeting. Within a year of the storm, Mindanao once again saw a surge in violent conflict.

Disrupting the Cycle of Vulnerability

The findings in our study support some general recommendations on meeting the challenges posed when tropical cyclones and political instability come into confluence.  Financing and supporting capacity for disaster risk reduction and adaptation programming, exercising fairness and transparency in aid, and supporting complete and sustained recovery are all both consistent with conflict de-escalation and avoid economic and political motives for increased conflict.

The ethical implications of intervening or not intervening with humanitarian assistance or government capacity are not simple in conflict settings in which lives—including the lives of civilians and relief workers—may be at stake. Concerns about the misuse or theft of resources intended for disaster preparedness or response, including to support violence, must also be addressed. Contextual knowledge of specific conflict actors and vulnerable populations is critical to policy design in such settings.

Looking to the future, climate change mitigation is essential to limiting the escalation of hazard exposure in the long-term, while reducing risks in the near-term requires adaptation strategies. Yet mitigation and adaptation cannot bear the full weight of this urgent challenge. To fully disrupt cycles of reinforcing vulnerability and conflict (especially in fragile settings), interventions to prevent conflict and mitigate risk from extreme weather events such as tropical cyclones are needed. Fragile places also face greater risks when disruptions affect resources for development, disaster risk reduction, and humanitarian assistance. Our work points to the urgent need to strengthen these efforts, just as their funding and support face alarming decline.

Our findings join other recent work that shows the importance of reducing overall vulnerabilities, especially given the highly context-specific ways in which violent conflict responds to environmental hazards. It is clear that a combination of weak institutions, social instability, and economic challenges increase vulnerability both to tropical cyclones and to conflict. Therefore their confluence has the potential to fuel a cycle of increasing vulnerability to both conflict and tropical cyclone events over time. There is an urgent need for international diplomacy and crisis prevention, including the strengthening of inclusive local institutions for disaster risk reduction to break this pattern.