In a time where climate action is urgent, there are debates how China’s “eco-authoritarianism” can move climate and environmental policies faster than in liberal democracies. Although eco-authoritarianism has some benefits, it is no “green bullet” as divisions between China’s central and local governments and a lack of civic participation can slow or derail some climate and pollution policies.

In its 2021 National Intelligence Estimate, the Biden-Harris administration contended that climate change will increasingly heighten instability and influence US strategic interests, including its competition with China. The administration argued how the transparency and consensus building at the center of democratic governance produce effective environmental regulations that are well enforced. It’s a concept similar to former US Vice President Al Gore’s argument that “an essential prerequisite for saving the environment is the spread of democratic government to more nations of the world.”

The disappointing climate action track record in countries like the US, however, has led many scholars argue that democracies do not always adequately protect the environment. They cite the short-term nature of political campaigns as one factor in this, as well as the influence of corporate lobbyists. Increasingly, environmentalists even question if democracies can move fast enough to protect the planet from pollution, greenhouse gas emissions and biodiversity threats. James Lovelock has claimed that climate change is so severe “it may be necessary to put democracy on hold for a while.”

This is a tempting argument, particularly when one looks at China’s breakneck speed in climate action. Yet it is not entirely accurate. Local governments in Chinese provinces often weaken top-down policies. Moreover, even in China, citizen participation still plays an important role in making climate and environmental policies more effective.

The Myth of Eco-authoritarianism

The challenge posed by the eco-authoritarianism argument (a.k.a. authoritarian environmentalism) has spurred research on whether one-party regimes do a better job protecting the environment. But the research findings are mixed as to which type of regime has a better record.

Research on China’s top-down climate actions has shown authoritarian regimes can quickly mobilize environmental policies, clean energy investments, and control dissenting citizens. Other scholars have found China’s coercive environmentalism model does not perform better than democracies in fighting environmental degradation. Indeed, China’s model environmental policies—such as grassland conservation—are less effective at protecting the environment and are used more for social control of Tibetan herders. Some empirical studies even show policies to reduce CO2 emissions are more effective in open societies with greater civil liberties.

Over the past decade, China has led the world in spending on clean energy technologies. Xi Jinping has also expanded environmental protection and climate change policies. Yet while the central government in Beijing is powerful, the success of these policies depends on the willingness of local governments to enforce them.

Does China’s strong authoritarian leadership under Xi better protect the environment? I undertook and investigation into this question with Xiang Gao, a Professor in the Department of Public Administration at Zhejiang University. Together, we conducted an extensive survey of Chinese local officials to see how strictly they are willing to enforce new green regulations.

The Limits of China’s Top-Down Eco-authoritarianism

In the past, local officials in China often did not enforce environmental regulations fearing harm to economic growth—a primary responsibility which is critical to any career advancement. The resulting “policy-implementation gap” led to decades of environmental degradation.

Upon taking office in 2012, Xi Jinping stated that one of his primary goals was to strengthen environmental protection—and he has enhanced the power of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment. In 2014, he launched a war on pollution with:

• Stricter laws with mandates for local government transparency in pollution reporting;
• Higher penalties for local governments that do not meet pollution targets; and,
• Nationwide environmental inspection campaigns.

To accomplish a change in incentives for local officials, Xi’s administration added environmental performance targets to annual promotion evaluations—and removed many economic ones.  

To understand the importance local officials now place on enforcing environmental regulations, we conducted a survey of 1,425 respondents from all levels of local government in 28 provinces.

One question we asked was how these officials would respond if ordered to implement a new environmental regulation that would cause harm to their community. In reply, 37.6% of respondents reported they would implement the policy fully (or enough to pass their annual evaluations) despite knowing that the policy would cause harm. Slightly over 16% would implement the policy but not at full capacity.

While these responses do support the authoritarian environmental argument, we also found some important distinctions—namely that local cadres will halt policy implementation if it is likely to trigger citizen protests. Not only does this finding challenge the environmental authoritarianism argument, but we also found most local officials (46.3%) would prefer to implement the policy with necessary adjustments to mitigate harm. As is the case with democratic leaders, the potential of economic harm reduces these officials’ willingness to fully implement environmental policies.

Balancing Environmental Regulations with Citizen Concerns

Countries around the world currently face challenges with environmental degradation and climate change. Yet no matter what form of governance holds sway, leaders must also be responsive to the needs and concerns of their citizens. Striking this necessary balance mitigates any potential “authoritarian environmental advantage.”

Significantly, this common challenge highlights the important role that civil society may play in mediating citizen concerns with the implementation of environmental policy. In fact, the interaction between the pressure for strict enforcement and the potential for citizen discontent creates more space for environmental NGOs in China.

In a recent interview with Green Zhejiang, this NGO’s leader described how local officials do not have the capacity to design programs to meet increasingly technical requirements, so they contract out program design to NGOs. Thus, community feedback obtained in this way is included in the design process.

As Weila Gong discovered in her research about decarbonization in China, community organizations play an important role in the just coal transition, similar to the part played by the Just Transition Fund in the United States. In several US states, as well as several provinces in China, the coal industry is one of the largest employers and the biggest source of local tax revenue. For instance, Shanxi Province derives 40% of its income from the coal industry. Gong points out that regions depending heavily on coal may not benefit from increasing renewable energy as much as other areas and will need more investment in local organizations and projects to manage this transition. Gong concludes that “China’s coal transition is not just about technology transformation. It’s also about social justice.”

Regardless of regime type, citizens must play an important role in developing solutions for climate transition policies if they are to be effective and sustainable. In fact, this is one area where sharing lessons learned from these communities could be an important area of Sino-US cooperation—and benefit how we address the global challenge of climate change.