How should the international community support the stabilization of Afghanistan after U.S. and NATO troops withdraw? Answers from President Biden, high ranking U.S. administration officials, and lawmakers have focused on funding the Afghan military and police and remotely retaining U.S. lethal capacity. Development aid is mentioned only in the vaguest of terms. But as withdrawal plans solidify, peace and resilience against insurgencies urgently require the administration to shift the focus to development and include support for local environmental governance. Looking at how crucial forests are to Afghanistan’s local economy and governance systems, we sketch the resource-conflict links and propose possibilities for local, environmental governance that the international community could support to quell insurgency and build the political, economic, and environmental foundations for peace in the country.

Forests and Insurgency

Forests are crucial for lives and livelihoods in rural Afghanistan, particularly in the northeastern regions where control is contested between local populations, a weak central government, and insurgent groups like the Taliban and ISIS. There are different pathways between conflict and timber depending on the type of forest. Oak forests are essential to local communities for livestock fodder and firewood for heating and cooking. Conifer forests provide commercial timber, which has long been one of the few profitable enterprises for the impoverished eastern forest provinces. Now, due to the high value of the timber, conifer forests are more directly linked to conflict through their exploitation for profit by insurgent groups.

In fact, the U.N. Environment Programme has called timber in Afghanistan “a classic conflict resource” and identified the timber and insurgency linkages as a key threat to peacebuilding. NRCC leaders concurred, writing that the timber trade “poses a direct threat to successful counterinsurgency operations.”

The government’s involvement in the timber industry has exacerbated the trade’s negative effects on Afghanistan’s people, environment, and security. A host of national and provincial laws dating back to 2002 made cutting timber for sale illegal. Still in effect today, the ban on timber ignored the reality of both domestic use and international trade. The ban has therefore been widely acknowledged to have criminalized a necessary local economy, undermining the legitimacy of the government and the law. The ban’s enforcement was minimal and selective, forcing participants to pay bribes to government officials in exchange for access to the trade and further damaging state legitimacy. Leaders of the Department of Defense’s Natural Resources Counterinsurgency Cell in Afghanistan (NRCC) found that attempts to stop the trade by direct intervention only antagonized villagers—and failed to stop the trade.

The illegal trade is a major security problem. It empowers insurgent groups such as the Taliban, ISIS, and other local armed militias which have the most power to override the ban and enforce claims to the forest in the absence of government enforcement. Although people from the villages and corrupt officials are also complicit in the trade, armed groups receive an outsized share of the profits. This cash is used for weapons, recruitment, and paying government soldiers to quit. Due to their high commercial value, conifer forests have precipitated land disputes and conflicts between insurgent groups which displaced villagers from their homes. In some instances, insurgent groups have won the support of villages by employing locals to cut, move, and secure the wood and distributing small amounts of timber for household uses. Though a small contribution, they have offered more to communities than the government has with an outright ban. 

The timber trade also contributes to conflict by exacerbating deforestation as insurgent groups have increased clearcutting over more sustainable traditional management. Widespread deforestation of the forests drives ecosystem degradation which causes cycles of floods and droughts that take lives, demolish homes, cripple agricultural livelihoods, and deprive villagers of wood for necessary household uses. An estimated 334,700 Afghans are affected by flooding each year, reducing the national GDP by $411.1 million. Partly due to flooding, one quarter of the Afghan population faced acute food insecurity in 2019.

In such a climate, the pressing need for human and economic security can drive insurgent recruitment and increase community-level, inter-ethnic, and regional conflicts. To sever deforestation’s direct and indirect contributions to conflict in the country, it is urgent to implement locally led, sustainable forestry.

A Better Alternative: Local Sustainable Governance

Strong local governance is required to prevent rural Afghans from needing to rely on corrupt, ineffective, and mistrusted government officials while at the same time decreasing the insurgencies’ appeal. Studies show that customary local leaders such as maliks and jirga or circles of elders who oversee community affairs—including natural resource management and dispute resolution—are the most trusted leaders in rural Afghanistan. Supporting these networks through programs operating at the most local level possible is a critically important avenue to increase accountability, reduce corruption, and foster stable governance. The NRCC says that “resilient rural communities represent the greatest bulwark against the Taliban” and UNEP calls for “involving communities more closely in the management of their local forests.” Insights like these need to be mainstreamed into the U.S. policy discussion on post-withdrawal counterterrorism.

The international community can support and fund sustainable local governance with a two-pronged approach of policy changes and educational campaigns that are underpinned by local consultation. Local consultation and governance cannot be stressed enough and should occur throughout all major reforms. Solutions explored in this article are not prescriptive proposals because the solutions must be developed, updated, and owned by local communities. For instance, national policy changes should be discussed and decided by the Loya Jirga, an assembly of leaders from throughout the country. More localized policy changes and development programs should be made in consultation with the local maliks and jirga, and this inclusion should be a condition of aid to any implementing partner.

Within an inclusive process, the ban on logging should be reconsidered. When the ban eliminated the legal timber market in 2002, it not only inadvertently generated black market funding for the insurgency and government corruption, it also wasted the opportunity to regulate the trade in a sustainable way that is profitable for villagers. In fact, the NRCC estimated the potential for an annual $40-80 million USD in sustainable timber trade. This could be developed through a certification scheme for sustainably sourced timber that does not fund conflict. External funding could support premium prices for certified sustainable and conflict-free timber to make it more economically competitive than its illicit counterpart.

Legalizing the trade would also secure more profit for villagers. Currently, around 95 percent of the timber is transported to Pakistan, where it is refined into higher value products and sold in lucrative export markets. Legalizing the trade could bring this business to Afghanistan and remove the costs of bribes and fees to corrupt Afghan and Pakistani officials, the latter of which is alone about 4.3 times the earnings of a local villager who logs or transports the wood. Additionally, investments to locally refine timber into more valuable cuts can significantly increase incomes for local Afghans.

The challenge will be to ensure that insurgents do not profit from this new sustainable timber trade. Prior to starting new projects, there must be assessments to locate the most viable villages for intervention, considering factors like the extent of insurgent presence and popular support for existing local governance networks.

Existing land disputes can be settled by the local leaders and resolution mechanisms, which should be given legal status in Afghan law to increase local investment in the long-term sustainability of the forests. To actively minimize insurgent control of forests, local communities should be given timber rights. Enshrining locally determined forest ownership should occur before removing the ban to prevent external actors from appropriating forest resources in a newly legalized timber sector. Indeed, the promise of legalized land ownership and greater control over timber harvesting could be a powerful motive for communities to resolve existing disputes.

These policy changes for a legalized, locally managed timber trade can be supplemented by strategies for increasing timber supply and decreasing demand. Timber supply can be increased by building on community-led afforestation and conservation programs. For example, the permits to sell certified timber can be conditioned on verified inspection of the maintenance of newly allotted trees. Successful maintenance can also be rewarded with funding. To reduce demand, external donors can invest in alternatives to timber for cooking, heating, and feeding livestock. For instance, improving insulation in homes would reduce household firewood needs.

These policy changes on the part of the state and external donors would be most effective when paired with education initiatives. A curriculum co-designed by community and international experts can train villagers and village leaders in sustainable environmental management, presenting the topic not as a western import but as a practice deeply rooted in the Quran. This program could cover the policy areas discussed in this article. These courses should have a hands-on component where application of best practices brings tangible rewards to community members. At each stage of the process, local villagers should be employed and compensated to carry out the required tasks such as monitoring compliance and planting trees.

With successful pilot programs in relatively secure villages, the initiative can be expanded until a forest association can be formed in which representatives from all forest villages can together shape the future of forest governance without turning to insurgency. Ultimately, a sustainable and locally run timber trade in the country can improve the livelihoods, environment, and security of Afghans and could reduce the chances of foreign troops returning to Afghanistan again.