The Horn of Africa faces critical security and climate risks. Persistent droughts have precipitated the onset of food insecurity and waterborne disease, while heavy rain events such as Cyclone Sagar have caused widespread flooding, mudslides, and wind damage. These challenges are increasing in severity against a backdrop of changing demographic trends—including rapid population growth, increased migration, and urbanization—and power struggles both within and between countries in the region.  

Taken together, these challenges are catalysts for conflict among pastoralists, herders, and local clans. Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda-related Al Shabab and the Islamic State in East Africa are also belligerents. 

Ecosystem Vulnerabilities: Drought and Climate Variability

The Horn of Africa is the continent’s easternmost point. It includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia. As a whole, the region experiences long droughts punctuated by heavy, intermittent rains. Climate change is compounding this cycle, and storm surges will likely become a growing problem across the continent. Cyclone Sagar, which struck in June 2018, was the most disruptive weather event in Somalia’s history. It dropped a year’s worth of rain in just a few days, causing widespread flooding and displacement in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Dijbouti.

Worsening livelihoods, changing mobility patterns, and elite exploitation of local grievances all act as catalysts for farmer-herder conflict. Climatic variance is directly linked to rising tensions in the region. Pastoralists, who rely on the land to maintain their livestock, bear the brunt of recent droughts. It should be noted that these droughts have had severe consequences. More than 250,000 people died in the 2010–2012 famine in Somalia.  

Transnational Trends: Migration and Pandemics

The African continent is experiencing extensive migration. The myriad reasons for this are difficult to disaggregate. East Africa is home to some of the largest populations of internally displaced people (IDPs) in the world. However, there is some precedent for reverse migration. As Al Shabab’s strength diminished within Somalia, for example, people returned to the country. And a 2012 UNHCR report noted that most climate-related migration in the region occurred only after all other options were exhausted, and was primarily a temporary measure.

Still, climate and violence-influenced migration are occurring at the same time that the population on the continent is increasing and rapidly urbanizing. 26 African countries are expected to double in size by 2050, a change which would make the continent home to three of the largest cities in the world. A better understanding of the drivers of migration, and how best to manage policies that bolster resilience of both the sending and receiving communities is therefore key to ensuring stability in the region.

Displacement caused by disruptive weather events diminishes a population’s resistance to diseases. Cholera is endemic to the region.  An outbreak such as Ebola that occurred in West Africa would have the potential to create a humanitarian crisis. Recent years have already illustrated the immense toll of such epidemics. The 2014–2016 outbreak infected 28,616 people and claimed 11,310 lives. As of July 2019, another 2,671 cases have been identified in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The World Bank estimates that the overall impact of Ebola is $2.8 billion, and that the economic impacts will continue to outlast the epidemiological impacts.

As with migration, the risk of an outbreak is compounded by climatic change in the region, and is an important security consideration.

Political Instability: Domestic Insurgency and International Power Struggles

Each of these factors is complicated by domestic insurgency in some East African countries and the associated drain on state resources. As the presence of terrorist organizations intensifies, foreign direct investment decreases. In turn, government capacity to fund new infrastructure is reduced at the same time existing resources are shifted to fight terrorism, rather than invest in communities. International aid groups are not necessarily able to break this cycle. During the 2011–2013 famine in Somalia, for example, Al Shabab was able to coerce and tax international aid agencies. Aid was withheld if the local population was unwilling or unable to comply with the group’s demands.  

Domestic insurgency further compounds the feedback loop between climate variability and migration. Climate variability is straining agricultural livelihoods and increasing competition for water. As prospects for farmers decrease, they begin moving to cities that lack the infrastructure and critical services to sustain their rapidly expanding populations; in part because resources are redirected to combat these insurgencies.

As countries in the Horn of Africa struggle with domestic insurgency, they are simultaneously the focus of growing rivalries among external state actors, particularly China and the United States. With bilateral ties to many African countries, China has grown its trade on the continent, surpassing U.S. investment. In 2017, the Chinese military established a naval base in Djibouti, signaling strategic interest in the region.

East Africa has also recently attracted interest from Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates Turkey, and Russia. International stabilization efforts could be complicated by the actions of external actors. 

Improving Predictive Capabilities and Early Warning

The nature of the risks facing the Horn of Africa create challenges for the U.S. military within the region. The military would likely be called upon to assist with humanitarian response to a pandemic. This contingency would require first responder capabilities that are not aligned with the military’s core strengths. There is therefore a need to evaluate U.S. capacity to act as an ally in the region.

As the aforementioned trends continue to grow, it is critical that country leaders direct discussions on security reform and governance initiatives. They have the best understanding of how disruptive events, including those caused by climate change, are threatening the economy and governance strategies on the ground.

International allies can support African-led efforts by providing training to strengthen technical capacity and further developing and enhancing early-warning systems such as the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), which provides regular reports on projected food insecurity and real-time reports on emerging crises. By using climate models to detect early warning signs, FEWS NET can track long-term climate drivers with accuracy. It then partners with NGOs and UN agencies to support food assistance programming.

While this tool has proven to be an effective mobilizer of early famine assistance, more reliable meteorological data is needed, particularly as climate variability increases. And the available data need to be better translated into policy recommendations that reflect an integrated assessment of the drivers of risk in the region. As we broaden our understanding of these drivers, we are likely to see further increases in the reliability and efficacy of our early warning systems.