From earthquakes to floods, when natural disasters strike, the military is often called on to bolster civilian responses. Policymakers throughout Latin America in particular are increasingly relying on the armed forces for emergency assistance.

An upward trend in extreme weather events and earthquakes in Latin America is stressing civilian capabilities. The military’s mobility and extended geographical reach are invaluable assets in these circumstances. And since the prospect of interstate war is considered a remote possibility, governments assume there are no liabilities in summoning these “idle” soldiers.

Government responses to these tragedies have also historically been heavily scrutinized. Entire political careers have been cut short when the response was gauged insufficient.

Nevertheless, Latin American policymakers should think twice about elevating disaster relief to a permanent military mission.

The Politics of Relief

Many of Latin America’s key political moments have been tied to disaster response.

Opposition to Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza grew into a momentous force after his inept handling of the reconstruction of Managua in the aftermath of the 1972 earthquake. Widespread dissent eventually led to the Sandinista Revolution shortly after.

In January 1944, seismic activity levelled the Argentine city of San Juan. The successful humanitarian assistance campaign chaired by Colonel Juan Perón elevated his rising star to new heights. Chance struck twice when he met his future wife and political partner Evita Duarte during a relief fundraiser. He was elected president in 1946 and redrew the course of Argentine politics.

Contemporary leaders are aware of this history. Chilean President Michelle Bachelet experienced the blowback of poorly executed relief operations firsthand during her first term. When an 8.8 magnitude earthquake struck central Chile in February 2010, leaving 500 people dead and 1.5 million displaced, civil defense and the police were overwhelmed. The government’s response was visibly inadequate.

Bachelet came under fire for her hesitation on whether or not to deploy troops to help. With the memories of human rights abuses committed under Augusto Pinochet’s military dictatorship still fresh, cabinet members wrangled among themselves over even granting temporary law enforcement powers to the armed forces.

After 48 chaotic hours, Bachelet finally declared a state of emergency and 16,000 military personnel were rushed to distribute assistance and reinstate order amid looting.

Bachelet took over for a second term in 2014 determined to avoid being cornered again. She acknowledged that Chile is “recurrently hit hard by nature” and made the case for “enhancing our armed forces’ response capacity against these emergencies.” To this end, she authorized the Navy to implement a national tsunami warning system and the Air Force to acquire Sikorsky UH-60M utility helicopters for search and rescue tasks.

Chile is not the only Latin American country facing these kind of recurrent scenarios. As explored in a recent report by the Wilson’s Center Latin American Program, the region is increasingly feeling the effects of climate change. Communities exposed to rising sea-levels are also being struck by more intense cyclones and tsunamis. Heavy rainfalls coupled with deforestation are generating extreme weather, flooding, and mudslides.

In Central America, most governments have established “military emergencies units” with the close support of the U.S. Southern Command. Chile and Peru have expressed their intention to follow suit. Argentina created a Secretary of Military Coordination in Emergency Assistance within the Ministry of Defense. And Brazil’s Army published its first military doctrine exclusively devoted to humanitarian assistance operations last year. It emphasizes the need to achieve a rapid deployment capability during natural disasters.

Subordinating Civilian Authority?

But policymakers should be aware of the downsides of writing in disaster relief as a permanent military mission.

First, it compromises the armed forces’ main mission: national defense. Organizations overburdened with multiple tasks tend to underperform all around. Eventually less training hours and funds will be allocated for defense-related training.

Second, disaster relief calls upon the military to carry out law enforcement activities. Most Latin American countries have legislation separating national defense from internal security for good reason, given a long history of officers intruding in civilian politics. Even if this legal conundrum is overlooked, soldiers tend to make poor policemen. They are simply not trained for domestic security.

And finally, elevating disaster response as a primary mission of the armed forces disrupts the chain of command and undermines military subordination to civilian authorities. For troops on the ground, it is unclear whether they should follow orders from their immediate superiors, local authorities, or civil defense agencies – most contingency plans do not establish a clear hierarchy.

Even if a full-blown military coup is unlikely in most Latin American countries today, it does not mean that officers automatically follow orders from civilian authorities. They occasionally challenge the specifics of directives or drag their feet when they disagree. Further elevating their role in disaster response would entail bargaining with the generals beyond normal institutional channels. It would therefore endow military leaders with a dangerous foothold in the political arena and policymaking process.

New Climate Context

Aside from preventive measures to reduce the drivers of climate change and effect of natural disasters on communities, the most desirable policy response for adapting is propping up civil defense agencies. Specialized personnel should be trained and budgets increased.

Admittedly, it may take years of nurturing until civilian institutions are able to produce tangible results. The catch is that urgency often trumps long-term planning when lives – and political careers – are on the line. But policymakers should be aware that relying on the military is a perilous game.

As noted by Samuel Huntington in one of his classic essays, the armed forces’ discipline, organizational skills, and expertise in technical matters make them attractive temporary substitutes for underperforming civilian agencies. The hazard lies in the exception becoming the rule: governments and the public growing complacent with the armed forces as the ultimate problem solvers. This predicament is compounded in a region where military subordination is far from perfect to begin with. Unfortunately, as the disasters pile on, numerous Latin American countries are walking down this road.